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Abstract
We sketch a broadening of the Gupta-Belnap notion of a circular or revision theoretic
definition into that of a more generalized form incorporating ideas of Kleene’s gener-
alized or higher type recursion. This thereby connects the philosophically motivated,
and derived, notion of a circular definition with an older form of definition by recur-
sion using functionals, that is functions of functions, as oracles. We note that Gupta
and Belnap’s notion of ‘categorical in L’ can be formulated in at least one of these
schemes.
Keywords Revision theory · Spector class · Kleene recursion · Theory of definition
1 Introduction
This article is partially of the nature of a survey, partially some exposition, but works
towards a context in which it is natural to make a suggestion for a generalisation of
Gupta and Belnap’s ([7]) theory of circular definitions to a broader theory. This takes
ideas from Kleene’s theory of higher type recursion ([14, 15]) to allow for circular
definitions that make calls to “sub-revisions” for further input to the revision process.
We offer a purely qualitative account of this, eschewing formal definitions which
might be intimidatingly lengthy (which can happen in higher type recursion theory)
in favour of a short informal description. Thus this article is not about truth per se,
but about definability. In the next section we outline the path taken from researchers
working on pure theories of truth, to the theory of circular definitions of the mono-
graph [7]. This, whilst very brief, has some historical flavour to it but has no pretense
to completeness. In Section 3 we discuss Burgess’s reformulation of Herzbergerian
revision sequences as a ‘theory of arithmetic quasi-inductive definitions’. This is thus
an early example of a shift away from Truth alone to thinking of revisions as in some
way building sets by some sort of inductive process (as Herzberger himself noted).
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The emphasis of this article, once past Section 2, is entirely on Herzbergerian
revision sequences, namely those that use a liminf process to form extensions of a
predicate to get past limit stages in the evolution of a revision sequence. Being a
mathematically precise, and determined, rule it makes each such sequence suscep-
tible to analysis in a way that a Belnap sequence with its unruly behaviour at limit
stages does not. This author was quite unaware of the theories of truth that used
revision whilst working on Hamkins’s and Kidder’s model of infinite time Turing
machines ([8], Section 4), but it turns out that such a machine can be thought of as
an example of a Herzbergerian revision sequence, since it too uses a liminf rule to
update its tape’s cell values at limit stages of time. Moreover, as a converse, an ittm
can be programmed to produce a Herzberger revision sequence on its output, together
with a final stability set of that revision. They are thus formally equivalent, and the
same countable ordinals appear in the analysis of their behaviour, of looping, halt-
ing, or whatever. There are now several notions using this kind of quasi-inductive
behaviour and hence often the sets generated are, up to recursive isomorphism, the
same (Theorem 1).
Any theory of inductive definability in whatever form must take account of
Moschovakis’s beautiful theory of Spector Classes (Section 5). There is a modest
amount of exposition here of this important theory. Sections 6 and 7 are devoted to
some new proposals for generalising circular definitions. The comments on ittm’s
will require the reader to be somewhat familar with such machines to be entirely
meaningful. No prior knowledge of Kleene’s higher type recursion is needed how-
ever. We conclude with some questions, all relating to this new kind of definabilty,
except the final one which relates to Gupta and Belnaps’s notion of ‘definably
categorical’ (Sect 6.D op. cit.).
A central reference is Gupta’s [6] where the theory as one of truth is explained;
however we shall move on to the monograph [7] which treats of circular defini-
tions more generally. The first part of the book indeed considers the problems of the
semantic approaches to truth, however (p.103):
“In our view hierarchies, whether they are constructed using fixedpoints or other-
wise, do not provide a promising solution to the descriptive problem”. (They seem to
think that such a theory reduces to a theory of “levels” which is “just as difficult”.)
“No matter how one constructs the hierarchy, one has to argue that certain sentences
containing global uses of ‘true’ do not mean what they seem to mean.”
In Chapter 4 a sketch is given of motivations for the Revision Theory to follow;
we quote liberally from their book to also motivate the ideas here. “The key to the
proper resolution of the problem of truth and paradox lies, in our view, in the theory
of definitions. The behavior of the concept of truth, both ordinary and pathological,
is strikingly similar to that exhibited by certain kinds of definitions.” (An example
is given that allows one to “prove” the doctrine of Monism; they point out that it
is similar to the moves in the Epimenides the Cretan paradox.) After giving further
examples of how circular definitions behave like self-referential truth assertions, they
set out (p117): “Our aim in this essay is to argue that these suggestions are more than
mere possibilities, that they are close to actuality. The logics of circular definitions
and truth, in our view, illuminate and support one another.” Henceforth (p119 -
here and later always with their emphases) “A circular definition, though it may not
Rethinking Revision
determine the extension of the definiendum, does provide a rule that can be used to
calculate what the extension should be once we make a hypothesis concerning the
existence of the definiendum”.
“The meaning a circular definition ascribes to its definiendum, we wish to suggest,
should be viewed as having a hypothetical character.” (p119). However (p121) what
will remain is “the main problem before us is to state precisely how the transition
from the merely hypothetical to the categorical is to be made.” (In other words how
to extract from all the various hypotheses one could give to the definiendum, those
facts of the matter as to which objects always fall into the eventual definiens).
Once the theory of circular definitions is founded it can be used (p142): “The
theory of truth sketched above is a consequence of combining a general theory
of definitions and Tarski’s suggestion that the biconditionals be viewed as partial
definitions. Tarki’s suggestion brings out clearly the circularity in the notion of truth”.
In order to fix some notation we sketch the main features of the General Theory
of Circular Definitions. Each definiendum G has a unique definition of the form:
(1) G(x1, . . . , xn) =df AG(x1, . . . , xn)
where AG is a formula of the language (that may contain other definienda
including G itself). If we restrict ourselves to countable languages (which we
shall) then a more general scheme is to have a countable sequence of definienda
Gi(x1, . . . , xni ) each given by a similar scheme with a formula AGi for each
Gi :
(2) Gi(x1, . . . , xni ) =df AGi (x1, . . . , xni ) for i ∈ N.
In more model theoretic looking terms this is:
G′i =
{
(x1, . . . , xni ) | (M, (Gi)i∈N) |= AGi [x1, . . . , xni ]}
where G′i is the ‘revised’ version of Gi at the next ‘stage’. Whilst it would appear,
prima facie that there was a great deal of complexity, or greater generality possible
with such ‘interlocking’ or mutually dependent defining clauses, in general this is
not the case: multiple simultaneous revision-theoretic definitions can be replaced, or
mimicked by a single definition. We shall take as a paradigm the usual structure of
M = N the natural numbers (where we have suppressed for convenience the other
predicates and function symbols, thusN is ‘really’ 〈N, 0,′ ,+,×, · · · 〉). We consider
then arrays of circular definitions as at (2). If we have an array that we can write
down, we shall assume therefore that we have an effective method for listing the
definitions of (2); thus the list is effectively computable. This is a starting assumption.
We shall also assume a starting distribution of extensions for theGi : some g0i ⊆ Nni ,
as initial hypotheses for each i ∈ N. The revisions g0i , g1i , g2i , . . . gki , . . . for k < ω
are unproblematic: they are given by (2). The problems start at limit cases: how to
define gωi ?
2 Limit Rules
In the Herzbergerian theory of truth ([9, 10]) we take a structure M (for simplic-
ity we assume that every element of the domain of M is named by a term of its
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language - as is the case for N) and we have by tranfinite recursion on the ordinals
Hα sets:
Hα+1 = {ϕ | (M, Hα) |= ϕ} .
where we assume as usual  .  : Sent → dom (M) is a coding of the sentences of
LM,T˙ - the language ofM augmented by a unary symbol T˙ , by objects in dom (M).
A starting hypothesis H0 is assumed. Herzberger himself never said that he was for-
mulating a theory if truth: he wanted a “non-directive approach”; “Rather than try
to eliminate those paradoxes, I want to consider the experiment of positively encour-
aging them to arise and watching them work their own way out.” ([9], p.479) He
formulated a ‘Liminf’ policy at limit stages: a sentence would be evaluated as ‘true’
at limit stage λ, if and only if there was some stage α < λ so that for all later β < λ
it was in Hβ . Whilst one might argue that this was some kind of parsimony in keep-
ing ‘trues’ to a minimum, it builds a fundamental asymmetry into the process: the
‘falses’ (or ‘not trues’) are swelled by all the sentences which have switched cofi-
nally in λ. He argued that there would be eventually ‘looping’ of the extensions of
Hα: some points σ0 < σ1 with Hσ0 = Hσ1 , and indeed there would be periodicity
in such loops which would run through the class of all the ordinals On. Herzberger
again: “The idea is to stand back and let the paradoxes reveal their inner principles”
(op.cit. p.479).
This is not the place to catalogue the subsequent discussions and papers by Gupta,
Belnap and others in their adaptations of Herzberger’s original idea. The thrust of
those discussions appears to be that limitations of the limit rules proposed always
treated some sentence in an ill-advised or undesirable manner. The ‘Belnap Rule’
that at a limit stage anything could be substituted as long as it was consistent with
the semantic values that were stable up to the point in question, then appears as the
inevitable and final limiting rule: there is no rule. It should however be pointed out
that both Gupta and Belnap thought that any attempt to move to the final truths or fal-
sities of their systems should involve considering all possible starting distributions or
hypotheses. The truths that emerged would be those stable in all possible sequences
from all possible starting hypotheses. This trial by fire would end up with the truth
sets being of very high complexity: e.g. with M = N such sets, albeit ostensibly
about first order truth, would only be second order definable in analysis with an ∀∃
alternating of second order quantifiers (see, for example, [2], 12.3). This is an order of
complexity that overwhelms the strength of almost any theorem of mathematics. (In
this author’s view, this already vitiates such theories as theories of truth over N with
a simple T -predicate.) Further efforts were made to introduce more sifting through
of truth sets, by requiring whole enumerations of the continuum be repeated cofinally
often through the ordinals, this somewhat Ptolomaic approach perhaps reaching its
apogee in [26].
Moreover, it would turn out that such truth sets would, up to a pencil and paper
algorithm, turn out to be the same whether obtained from a Herzberger, a Gupta, or a
Belnap rule, if one is adapting the procedure of intersecting over all starting hypothe-
ses. (Moreover for a Belnap Rule - [1] - with its unlimited freedom at limit stages,
one can replace the quantification over the real continuum of starting hypotheses that
results in truth sets of such high complexity just alluded to, and instead one could
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always start with a single, empty say, hypothesis as extension; the application of
the limit ‘Rule’ alone would then embed that real universal quantification in another
way. However, as the referee has kindly pointed out, this embedding of universal
quantification into the limit stages will not be possible for simple models where sen-
tences only have quote-names in the domain of the model, but where coding and
self-reference is not possible. This article really only considers models extending that
of the natural numbers with revision theoretic definitions that make use of Go¨del cod-
ing - and hence allow the possibility of self-reference.) The phenomenon is discussed
in [23], [16], indeed in a number of other places, and by a variety of authors.
However the emphasis of the 1993 book [7] is shifted. Whilst the introductory
sections are speaking of truth and how the Tarskian biconditionals are definitional
of truth, and deliver the signification of truth, when the actual descriptions of the
technical apparatus commence they are through the medium of a theory of circular
definitions. The definition of truth will then be just one example of a circular defini-
tion. The thrust of the argument is then in defining, and investigating their notion of
circular definition as I have hastily sketched it above.
As opposed to the theory of truth, the theory of circular definitions seems entirely
unexceptionable: Belnap and Gupta give a full definition of such. Then, afterwards,
the application to truth is considered with various alternative versions of notions of
validity etc. discussed. It is solely on the theory of circular definitions that we want
to focus in this article.
3 Circular Deﬁnitions
The case of circular definitions using the Herzberger Liminf rule is amenable to a
close mathematical investigation of its structure and outcomes. For the rest of this
article we shall restrict ourselves to this style of Herzberger sequence. (Thus ‘cir-
cular definition’ or, synonymously, ‘revision theoretic definition’ will be interpreted
via revision sequences based on the Liminf rule. Usually we consider just a sin-
gle inductive process emanating from a single starting ‘hypothesis’, ‘point’ or ‘set’.
There will be no ‘averaging out’ over all starting hypotheses.) In his 1985 article [2],
Burgess takes a notion of arithmetical quasi-inductive definition (a.q.i.). An a.q.i. set
Y ⊆ N is given by having an arithmetic formula Φ(v0), taking a starting hypothesis
Y0 = ∅, and revising according to scheme (1) over M = N, with the Liminf rule at
limit stages. The emphasis is then on the single revision sequence, rather than ‘aver-
aging’ over the continuum many such with differing Y0. Tractably, he gave an exact
characterisation of the a.q.i. sets of integers, as those definable at a certain level of
complexity at a certain level of the Go¨del constructible hierarchy. As this feature
will loom large in the following discussion we dwell on this here. The connection
with the constructible hierarchy should not be surprising: each successor stage opera-
tion of Yα  Yα+1 is an arithmetic one; the starting hypothesis, ∅, is a constructible
set (!) as is the structure M = N. As arithmetic operations are absolute between
V and L, running the revision sequence inside L yields exactly the same sequence
〈Yα | α ∈ On〉 as outside. But the liminf rule is expressible in a Σ2-fashion. Conse-
quently the sequence 〈Yα | α < λ〉 is definable by a Σ2-recursion set-theoretically
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inside the structure 〈Lλ,∈〉. Hence the membership of say n in Yλ is given by a
Σ2 expression over 〈Lλ,∈〉, and is dependent only on Φ and Y0. The easy part of
Burgess’s argument is to consider what happens if we then continue until some ordi-
nal ζ0 where for some larger ζ1 > ζ0 we have that Lζ0 ≺Σ2 Lζ1 . (‘M ≺Σ2 N ’ means
that any Σ2 sentences about objects in |M| which is true in N is also true in M.)
But this means the membership question of whether n is in Yζ0 has the same outcome
as in Yζ1 . In short Yζ0 = Yζ1 . We thus have arrived at an hypothesis that is destined to
‘loop’ with a fixed periodicity (in fact of period ≤ ζ1). Then Yζ0 is deemed to be the
a.q.i. set that this process throws up. We may then write Y∞ = Yζ0 . (The harder part
of the argument is to say that any set Z ⊆ N that is Σ2-definable over Lζ0 is also
definable by an a.q.i. scheme of this kind.)
That a.q.i. schemes in this manner run to the ordinal ζ0 is indicative of their
strength. (The assertion that every a.q.i. scheme over M = N reaches a loop can be
proven in Π13 -CA0 but not in Π
1
2 -CA0: one needs these strong systems to prove that
sufficiently long ordinals exist along which one may run the quasi-inductive progres-
sions.) The a.q.i. set Y∞ is generated by a process over a long stretch of the countable
ordinals, far longer than the often considered recursive ordinals with supremum the
Church-Kleeneωck1 . One may I suppose, take the idea that positive, or ‘certain’, mem-
bership in Y∞ is afforded by this process of determining via ‘eventual membership’,
whilst all other elements are excluded.
In any case, it is a scheme of definability that involves processes with ordinals to
a greater degree than the monotonic processes that usually occur in, say theories of
truth, or indeed philosophical logic generally. At the risk of repetition it is precisely
this involvement of ‘ordinal analysis’ at limit stages, that introduces an element that
is far from the original motivation of finding ‘truths’ over the structure of the natural
numbers - indeed disqualifying that outcome set H∞ from having much to do with
truth overN.
However we can just regard the theory of revision theoretic circular definitions
as proposed by [7] as one further method of defining interesting classes of formu-
lae/sets, without suggesting that this gives a formal method to deciding what, e.g.
‘truths’ are over N, or what a given scheme such as at (1) delivers. It should be
pointed out again, that one indication of the overwhelming nature of the ordinal con-
struction, is that for Herzberger revision sequences, a whole slew of different sets will
yield essentially the same outcome: whether H0 is empty, or is any recursive set of
truth values (or even hyperarithmetic or yet more complicated) the resultant sets H∞
will all be recursively isomorphic: there will be again pencil and paper algorithms
for converting one to the other: all differences of the initial hypothesis will have been
dwarfed by the complexity of the definitions’ ordinal machinery.
However the theory of circular definitions still provides a method for defining sets
of objects from a structure by some form of ‘quasi-inductive’ definition. The non-
monotonicity of the construction and the dependence on relatively long countable
ordinals has probably meant that this is a system that does not crop up frequently (or
as some would say: ‘naturally’) elsewhere. There are two avenues to explore here:
relations to infinite time Turing machine computation - which turned out, indepen-
dently, to have exactly the same strength as Herzberger revision; and the methodology
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with which we shall be concerned to sketch an exposition of here: an enlarged notion
of higher type circular definition akin to Kleene’s recursion in higher types.
4 Inﬁnite Time TuringMachines
To this author’s knowledge, Benedikt Lo¨we seems to have been the first to point
out (in correspondence) the formal similarities between the construction of a single
Herzberger sequence and that involved in the Infinite Time Turing Machines (ittm’s)
of Hamkins and Kidder ([8]). In the papers ([17, 18]) this was investigated. The
original ittm model of [8] used a limsup rule to update a Turing machine tape’s cells,
but in terms of computational power this is identical to a liminf rule, and so this
difference is ignored. The formalisms are indeed parallel: one can write an ordinary
Turing machine program PH so that on input the hypothesis H0, the machine will
behave just like a Herzberger sequence writing successively the values Hα to its
output tape. The machine will loop itself (this is an essential feature of such machines
just as it was for Herzberger), and so for H0 = ∅ the machine loops with H∞ =
Hζ0 = Hζ1 , for the very same ζ0, ζ1 occurring above in Burgess’s proof.1
In general such machines (on input some set of integers in Lζ0) when not halting
will loop in the same fashion with output tapes repeating at the same times ζ0, ζ1 for
whatever the program, just for the same reasons as for H -sequences.
The equivalence of a string of such sets defined in differing manners, show
that mathematically the same processes have been involved. One can establish the
following recursive isomorphisms between sets of integers. Here D is the set of
determinately true sentences in Field’s [3]; 0˜ is the Σ2-truth set of Lζ0 , and U∞ is a
complete or universal a.q.i. set. Finally a jump set: J = {e | the e’th ittm program
Pe(e) has a fixed output}.
Theorem 1 [24] The following sets of integers are recursively isomorphic:
a) H∞; b) U∞; c) D ; d) 0˜ ; e) J .
(Burgess’s arguments in [2], without explicitly stating it, essentially show the
equivalence of a),b), and d).) The appearance of D on the list is all down to the fact
that Field uses a liminf rule starting from a recursive distribution of initial semantic
values. At successor stages he uses a completely different approach: instead of an
arithmetic operation, or a simple truth taking operation, he uses a Kripkean Strong
Kleene jump at each stage, which is a big leap in complexity. But as indicated above
the liminf rule used at limit stages irons out all subtleties of the successor step. One
should say, mathematical subtleties, since his final set D, eminently does what he
requires: it is a set of sentences with precisely the set of logical subtleties he is aiming
for: this shows the consistency of his approach. Since his stance is purely instrumen-
talist, and is using the revision sequence purely to demonstrate the existence of a set
1Indeed these features of ittm’s had been independently discovered in [22], whilst being quite unaware
of the connections to the earlier Herzberger revision theory that Lo¨we pointed out, and in ignorance of
Burgess’s work.
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with the right desiderata, the revision theoretic means of doing it, is, for him, not the
point.
However the point of highlighting the theorem is that we have several quite differ-
ent ideas, two truth theoretic, one set theoretic, and one from generalised notions of
computability, all of which converge on the same sets, and all are examples of revi-
sion theoretic definitions. So perhaps this kind of quasi-inductive definition is a little
more ‘natural’ than at first thought.
5 Moschovakis’s Theory of Spector Classes
The mathematical logician may be prompted to ask how revision theoretic defini-
tions, or the “a.q.i.” in Burgess’s nomenclature, fit in with the well-developed theory
of Spector Classes. This is a beautiful structure theory of definable relations over
structures M elucidated by Moschovakis in the late 1960’s and 1970’s. (See his
monograph [19] but also the later [20]; the paper [13] also gives short definitions and
results relating to generalised quantifiers.)
Definition 1 LetM = (M,R1, . . . Rn) be an infinite relational structure. A class of
relations Γ on M is called a Spector Class on M, if:
(i) Γ is closed under ∧,∨, ∃, ∀;
(ii) Γ contains all relations that are first order definable over M using parameters
from M;
(iii) Γ is M-parameterized;
(iv) M contains a coding scheme;
(v) (PWO) Γ has the prewellordering property.
We have given the full definition in order to talk about some aspects in more
detail. We need to give some explanation: (i) and (ii) are straightforward basic closure
conditions. (iii) amounts to saying that for each n there is a universal set Un ∈
Γ ∩ Mn+1 so that for any other R ∈ Γ ∩ Mn there is some a ∈ M so that
(3) 〈r1, . . ., rn〉 ∈ R ←→ 〈r1, . . ., rn, a〉 ∈ Un.
(If we think ofM = N and Γ as the collection of Π11 -relations overN, then these
areN-parametrized: there is a universal Un ∈ Π11 so that any n-ary Π11 -relation R is
the fibre over some a ∈ N of Un in the manner of (3).)
A coding scheme is somewhat lengthy to define and write out and we shall not do
it, but essentially it amounts to a definable ‘pairing function’ overM , sendingM×M
to M; by ordinary definability there are thus functions Mn−→M: Γ must contain a
suitable class of such functions.
Lastly the important property (v): for any, say, relation R ∈ Γ we may
prewellorder R using some ordering ≤ ∈ Γ (a prewellorder only fails to be a
wellorder because we may have a ≤ b ∧ b ≤ a without a = b; it thus wellorders
a collection of equivalence classes of elements of M). Associated to a prewellorder-
ing ≤ then is a wellorder of these equivalence classes and hence a rank function
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or norm σ : R−→On. Actually the prewellordering property requires something
slightly stronger than requiring that ≤ ∈ Γ , it almost requires that both ≤ and ≤ are
in Γ , but it is not quite as strong as that. It actually says of R and σ that there are
relations S, T ∈ Γ so that (letting ¬T be the complement of T ) :
(4) y ∈ R−→ [(x ∈ R ∧ σ(x) ≤ σ(y))←→S(x, y)←→¬T (x, y)] .
Why are Spector classes important? Clearly the definition collects together some
basic properties needed to allow some basic reasoning about classes of relations.
The PWO condition is of a different kind to the the others. What it enables is the
following: If one has relations R1, . . . Rn in a Spector class Γ over a structure M,
and P is any relation over M inductive in the Ri then too P ∈ Γ . A Spector class
associated with a suitable structureM is thus closed under inductive definability over
that M. In general there is a rich structure theory of Spector classes going beyond
these few statements here.
All the Kleene pointclasses of Π1n ,Σ
1
n for any n ≥ 1 satisfy all the clauses, except
perhaps for the prewellordering property. The smallest provable Spector class over
N is the class of relations Π11 - so inductive - over N. This is the canonical example
of such a Spector class. From this it can be shown that the Σ12 classes form a Spector
class. However beyond that, it is a matter of strengthening the axioms of set theory
(usually by determinacy hypotheses) to establish this for further classes such as Π13
and above. (And even just for Π11 and Σ
1
2 , isolating the Spector class properties they
enjoy allows many more results to be proved about them - see [20] 4C.)
Since Π11 forms a Spector class we already have an instance of this in theories of
truth: the minimal fixed point in the various schemes proposed by Kripke. Suppose
we take the Strong Kleene scheme as an example. The PWO property of the definition
above requires that the set of truths in the minimal fixed point, (V +, V −) say, (which
is a Π11 (pair of) sets) be prewellordered in a Π
1
1 fashion. This it is: for the natural
ordering on sentences ϕ ∈ V + given by ‘σ(α) is the least ordinal α such that ϕ ∈
Vα+1\Vα’ is map from V + onto ωck1 , one can find S, T Π11 relations to satisfy (4).
Further properties of Spector classes imply that one can prove versions of the
Recursion Theorem. One may ask: is a Spector class always given by some form
of inductive process? A theorem of Harrington shows that any Spector class over
a structure M can always be viewed as an inductively given class, if one allows
the inductive definition to be in a language with a generalised quantifier (such a
quantifier Q is any set ∅ = Q ⊆ P(M) which is monotone, that is A ⊆ B ∧ A ∈
Q−→B ∈ Q; such a quantifier has a dual ¬Q). Let us denote the usual language for
M enhanced by the quantifer Q and its dual, as LM,Q. We then have:
Theorem 2 (Harrington - Representation Theorem, [13] 3.2) IfM = (M, R1, . . . Rn)
is a structure and S a Spector class over M then there is a quantifier Q over M so
that S is precisely the class of relations inductive over M in the language LM,Q.
Turning to the specific matter in hand, we have that:
Theorem 3 The relations a.q.i. overN form a Spector class onN.
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Proof The relations on N which are the outputs of ittms can be shown to form a
Spector class. As each a.q.i. can be mimicked on an ittm, and vice versa, these outputs
coincide with the a.q.i.-definable relations ofN, and the result follows.
The essential part of the fact that the a.q.i.-definable relations form a Spector class,
has to be then that there is an a.q.i. prewellordering on any X ⊆ N which is a.q.i.
Just as for Kripkean minimal fixed points that prewellordering is simply explained:
define a norm by setting, for an n ∈ X, σ(n) to be that ordinal α such that from stage
α onwards n is in the α’th iteration of the a.q.i. definition. Then (it can be shown)
σ maps the stable truths onto ζ0. Some consequences are then deducible for revision
theoretically definable sets over N. The following is a ‘Boundedness Lemma’ for
a.q.i. definitions. It can be regarded as an example of a general theorem about Spector
classes due to Moschovakis (see [19] 3C.1).
Lemma 1 (Boundedness Lemma for a.q.i. definitions)
(i) Any wellorder α that is coded by some setX ⊆ N, if bothX andN\X are a.q.i.
then α < ζ0.
(ii) But every ordinal α < ζ0 is so coded by an a.q.i.-definableX whose compliment
is also a.q.i.
Ultimately some form of this Boundedness Lemma is used in the main argument
of [25] which refutes Field’s claim that there is a revenge-immune solution to the
semantic paradoxes (as worked towards in [3, 4]): the argument of [25] establishes
that the potentially definable length of Field’s determinateness hierarchies is again
this ordinal ζ0, but that diagonalisation still enables us to transcend this.
Lemma 2 ‘Uniform Definability’ ([25]) There is a single uniform method of arith-
metically defining the whole sequence 〈Hγ | γ < β〉 from Hβ for any β < Σ . This
method is uniform in the sense that it is independent of β.
From the lemma one may derive the fact that we can express “being stably true”
within the language:
Corollary 1 There is a formula Φ(v0, v1) so that Φ(ψ, n¯) expresses “ ψ(v0)
is a code of a formula and ψ[n¯/v0] is stably true” in the language of arithmetic, so
that if ψ a.q.i. defines the set A ⊆ N, then k ∈ A iff Φ(ψ, k¯) itself is in H∞.
6 Revision Theoretic Deﬁnitions in Higher Type: Relativized
Deﬁnability
The previous sections have sketched out some of the historical development of the
analysis of one particular kind of revision theoretic definition: that of the Herzberger
style, liminf, single revision sequence, with the monadic relation ultimately defined
being the eventual stable collection of objects in the extension of the defined symbol.
However if we take revision theoretic definitions seriously we should also think about
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how such definitions can be strengthened or extended, or how they might fit in either
with notions coming from the Spector class theory of definable relations, or, for
example, the classical theory of higher type recursions due to Kleene, or indeed any
other theories of definability developed by mathematical logicians.
Theorem 1 above encourages us to think of, at least in its Herzberger version, cir-
cular definition as potentially a kind of recursion, or quasi-inductive process, albeit
of a transfinite kind. If we consider ordinary recursions or computations a` la Tur-
ing, there is the notion of an oracle: a set A ⊆ N and an adaption of the computable
process with a functional call to ask the question ? Is k ∈ A ? and to receive a 1/0,
or Yes/No answer; this is envisaged as taking one step in the computation’s pro-
gramme which has an enlarged syntax and grammar to accommodate such oracle
queries. The resulting theory of relativised computability, going back to Turing and
Post, is a highly developed one (see for example [21] for a contemporary account).
One can effect the same for ittm’s. However note here that A, being merely a sub-
set of N, could actually have been written out in full on the starting input tape, and
a programme consulting an oracle for A is tantamount to another related programme
searching through an input tape on which A is written out in full. Suppose one envis-
aged a Herzberger revision sequence over M = N, with the ability at a stage to
quiz a set A of this kind. Then we could regard this as a circular definition over the
expanded structure (M, A) instead, and thus have no need for this kind of extended
circular definition. The circular definition over the expanded structure thus replicates
the move of writing the data to the tape of the ittm.
So whilst this can be developed as a theory of relativised circular definability we
have not captured any significantly new process. A more substantial notion would be
to consider instead as oracle set some A ⊆ 2N. Now we may think of relativised
circular definability as occurring over the two sorted structure M = (A,N). We
continue to think of the domain of M as still the natural numbers, and all of these
are named in the language. It is now that the circular definition, meaning the actual
formula defining by repetition our extension, contains a symbol A˙, and may quiz A
as to whether the current extension of G˙ is, or is not, in A. In this way, significant
information can be introduced into the quasi-inductive process. As the reader by now
may suspect, this is mirroring an analogous notion of relativised ittm-computation,
where an ittm may query the oracle set A (⊆ 2N), as to whether, say, the current
output tape contains an element of A.
We may then consider the class of relations over N that are A-revision theoreti-
cally definable, for any given A:
Lemma 3 Let A ⊆ 2N. The class of relations over N that are A-revision-
theoretically definable form a Spector class.
(A proof of this lemma can be found in the Appendix).
Whilst ittm’s are intimately tied up with computing on Cantor space, that is 2N,
revision theoretic definitions are not. We correspondingly have something more general:
Lemma 4 Let M be an acceptable structure. Let A ⊆ 2dom(M). The class of
relations over M that are A-revision-theoretically definable form a Spector class.
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(We abstain from defining properly what an acceptable structure is: the reader will
have enough of an idea, if one imagines a structure which contains something like a
copy of the natural numbers, with definable pairing functions. The Lemma bears the
same relation to the predecessor as similar results about acceptable structures with
coding schemes do to the basic case of the natural number structure. The reader may
find how this is done for acceptable structures in [19].) One may then define ordinals
which correspond to ζ0 and ζ1 above; these may be identified, and play the same
analogous role. We do not explore this here. But there is one particular A ⊆ 2N we
should like to consider.
E = {S ⊆ 2N | ∃H∃Φ ∈ LH˙ [S is the stability set of the revision theoretic definition
starting with H = H0 and defining formula Φ]}.
Thus E is the set of all possible stability sets of (ordinary) circular definitions
with any possible starting hypothesis. However now note that for circular definability
relativized to E , more will be definable using such relativized definitions: for, e.g.
with H0 = ∅, a relativized definition in LH˙ can be written that eventually will
‘recognize’ H∞, the stability set (it will successively quiz E and eventually receive a
1 back that the extension is indeed that stability set). The definition may then invoke a
clause to go off and do something else. Thus the ability to recognise simple stability
sets, will lead to a larger class of circular-definable relations. These will also form
a Spector class. The ‘Spector ordinal’ corresponding to ζ0 can then be investigated
(and will be larger than the original).
7 Generalised Revision Theoretic Deﬁnitions in Higher Type:
Recursion a` la Kleene
Kleene’s equational calculus of recursion in type 2 (or more) objects ([14, 15] are
the original papers, but rather for expository accounts see [5, 11, 12]) lends itself
to motivating a corresponding generalisation of revision theoretic definability which
is much wider and further reaching. Instead of the ‘simple’ A-revision theoretically
definable relations, where the oracle set A is quizzed at a single step in the revision
process, we can demand more. We envisage a query as being a ‘subroutine’ call, not
just to give a simple yes/no answer about some membership questions (although in
effect it will do that), but rather dynamically as a call to answer a query by acting
out another subordinate revision theoretic definition demanded by the ‘control’ or
‘master’ revision process. To illustrate: suppose as above we have a Herzberger-
style revision sequence based on a defining formula Φ(k, H˙ ). Suppose we have a
recursive enumeration 〈Φe(v0, H˙ ) | e ∈ N〉 of all such formulae. The formula Φ
may contain some clause so that at some stage a query is triggered about some e,
some k, and the current extension of H at this stage of the revision process, as to
whether k would be in the stability set of the revision sequence starting withH , using
formula Φe. (The e and k need not be fixed in advance, but could be determined by
the revision along the way. We abbreviate by ‘〈e, k,H 〉’ such a query triple.) We thus
may imagine not just receiving out of the ether a yes/no response, but a sub-revision
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takes place that performs the sequence of revisions, and inspects the result, and passes
back the appropriate answer.
So far, little would appear to be different from the E-revision theoretic definitions
just defined. The crucial difference is that we regard the revision theoretic definition
based on 〈e, k,H 〉 just described, as also itself capable during its revision stages of
making further queries of the same form 〈e′, k′, H ′〉, thereby initiating further sub-
revision-theoretic definitions. (This is mimicking the higher type recursive element
of Kleene’s generalised recursion.) Each of these latter sub-revisions themselves may
initiate further such, and so on. The outcome is that a successful generalised revision
of this form can be represented by a downward growing tree from the top-most node
ν0 as root, labelled with 〈Φ,H0〉 (see Fig. 1.)
At the first query 〈e1, k1,K1〉 a node ν1 is drawn connected below the top-most
node labelled with this triple as the current sub-query. If the revisionΦe1 starting with
K1 in turn instigates a query 〈e2, k2,K2〉, this latter triple labels a node ν2 of the tree
connected below ν1. If this query at ν2 is answered without any further sub-revision
calls, then an answer is passed up to ν1, (meaning that the revision 〈e2, k2,K2〉 con-
tinues to some looping stage, and then it is apparent whether k2 is in the stability
set or not; this information is passed up to the node directly above - in this case ν1-
that called this subrevision; the call to the node ν2 is then over) and the revision
〈e1, k1,K1〉 now continues having received its answer. If the continuing revision at
ν1 makes a further query 〈e3, k3,K3〉 at a later stage in its own running, then node ν3
can be represented as being written connected by a branch below ν1 again, but placed
to the right of ν2. This ν3 is at a level “at depth 2” below ν0. In Fig. 1. 〈e3, k3,K3〉
makes a call at some stage for some 〈e4, k4,K4〉, before it stabilizes, and so on. A
‘successful’ or convergent revision of this kind then is represented by a well founded
finite path tree T (Φ,H0) with nodes labelled below the top of the form 〈eτ , kτ ,Kτ 〉
for τ < θ . As the revision proceeds each of the nodes is visited in turn (according to
the increasing index τ < θ) in a left-most path search fashion.
Fig. 1 Tree of sub-revision calls
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Can a revision of this kind fail to produce a stable set? Indeed it can: it would be
an exercise to write a self-referential revision theoretic definition which calls itself
so to speak. The resulting tree would then have an infinite descending branch - that
is would be ill-founded. In this case the outcome of the revision would be undefined,
we should say the revision was divergent, and no answer or stability set would result.
Can we characterise which initial 〈Φe,H 〉 revisions are convergent? We collect
the convergent revisions together by looking for a least fixed point of a functional Δ
to be defined in the following manner. We set:
Δ(X) :=
{〈〈Φe, k,H 〉, i〉 | the revision 〈Φe,H 〉 is convergent and makes calls only to sub-
revisions 〈〈Φe′, k′, H ′〉, i′〉 ∈ X, with resulting response i = 1/0 iff k is, or is not, in
the resulting stability set of 〈Φe,H 〉}.
We then set Δ0 = ∅; Δα+1 = Δ(Δα); Lim(λ)−→Δ<λ = ⋃α<λ Δα ∧ Δλ =
Δ(Δ<λ).
Clearly Δ is a monotone operator and will have a least fixed point Δ∞. We then
have a (type 2) functional S (for ‘stability’) by setting S = Δ∞. The convergent
revisions 〈Φe,H 〉 are then precisely those so that for some k 〈Φe, k,H 〉 ∈ dom(S).
There are many questions that can be asked about this generalised revision-
theoretic definability. We have ‘answered’ the question of which revisions are
convergent, by means of the fixed point ofΔ, but this gives little concrete information
on its own.
Q1 What is the relation of the original Herzbergerian revision sequences to this
proposal?
Q2 Is there some further way to characterise the convergent 〈Φe,H 〉?
More questions will occur to the reader:
Q3 If 〈Φe,H 〉 is convergent, how many steps of revision does it take to loop?
Q4 How complex are the resulting stability sets? What kind of sets can we regard
them as defining for us?
More particular than Q4 is:
Q5 How strong a theory is needed to define these general revision procedures?
In particular for, say, recursive H , which ordinals can be defined by the
generalised revision 〈Φe,H 〉?
We finish with one more question that does return to the roots of revision: the
notion of expressing ‘categorical in L’ within L. The relevant starting point here is
[7]’s Section 6D. Here ‘categorical in L’ means being stably true in every (pertinent
for the discussion) revision sequence. Again let us fix the discussion as referring to
Herzeberger revision sequences over M = N. The problem of categoricity is that
simple assumption of its definability over all revision sequences leads to strengthened
liar paradoxes. As an example: suppose that the concept “ϕ is categorical in L” were
definable over all revision sequences by the formula Ψ (v0) of L. This means:
(1) Ψ (σ) is is categorical in L iff σ is categorical in L.
(2) ¬Ψ (σ) is categorical in L iff σ is not categorical in L.
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By diagonalisation find a sentence σ so that σ ←→¬Ψ (σ) ∨ ¬T (σ). Such
is our strengthened liar sentence. If σ is categorical in this sense then so is T (σ).
But then so is ¬Ψ (σ) which is absurd. The case of ¬σ being categorical, and the
case of neither being categorical also easily lead to contradictions.
The question addressed in 6D is whether being ‘categorical in L’ can be expressed
with the given language or whether one needs to ascend to a metalanguage (p229).
Belnap and Gupta argue that diagnosis of the strengthened liar is that the notion of
categoricity is just as circular as that of truth, and should be handled by the same
methods as ‘true in L’: namely as a rule of revision within the language. We thus
choose as a hypothesis for being categorical some collection of sentences K0. We
consider the enlarged structure M = (N,K0) and in the extended language LM
build revision sequences over that. The stable truths that survive this process then
form a new hypothesis K1 for a repeat of the construction. At limit stages one does,
well, whatever one does at limit stages, but in this case we naturally take liminf’s
to mirror that process for truth. Gupta and Belnap then give examples (pp.233-234)
of how ‘Strengthened Liars’ and ‘Strengthened Truth Tellers’ are handled in this
framework. The thrust of their argument is that certain semantic concepts derived
from their approach, such as this form of categorical truth, can be handled with their
methods and that there is no need to ascend to a meta-language. But for us here
we should like to see how this can be handled with these extended ideas of circular
definition. The way this has been described here I think allows us to see that this could
be easily done using the relativised circular definability of Section 6: one allows the
circular definition to consult E : we let K be the stability set of the circularly defined
sequence of extensions of 〈Kν |ν ∈ On 〉. Then it is easy to see that K is E-revision
theoretically definable.
It would seem that using generalized revision theoretic definability just sketched
ought to allow one to also describe a notion of robust categoricity. so we ask:
Q6 Can one use the generalized revision theoretic definability of this section to
define a notion of categoricity similar to, but perhaps stronger than, that of K?
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 3 Let . The class of relations over that are A-revision-
theoretically definable form a Spector class.
We first return to considerations of why the a.q.i. relations form a Spector class
(Theorem 3 above). The proof of the lemma (which the reader may omit) would start
by mentioning Burgess’s argument ([2], Lemma 14.1) that the a.q.i. subsets of are
those (1-1) reducible to those relations that are Σ2-definable over Lζ , where ζ is the
first point where a repeating extension of any Herzberger revision theoretic sequence
occurs. The class of such relations defined in such a manner is well-known to form
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a Spector class, but to check the latter one has to check the conditions in Definition
1 above. The main points are to argue first that there is for each n, a universal a.q.i.
relation Un of n + 1 variables that parametrizes via its first cordinate the n-ary a.q.i.
relations. This follows since there is a universalΣ2 formula forΣ2-satisfaction in the
language of set theory over such an Lζ . The most significant feature of a class of sets
Γ being a Spector class, is the Prewellordering property (v) on the list above: that for
any relation (say to take the unary case) in Γ there should be relations S, T
in Γ that satisfy (4) above for the norm σ derived from a prewellordering.
For us here, a natural norm on such an R (which is a.q.i. as a binary relation) is
given by the ordering that for n,m ∈ R we set n  m↔n is stably inR in the revision
sequence from no later a stage than that of m.
One has to check that there are corresponding relations S, T which are also Σ2-
definable and so themselves a.q.i., but this follows as ‘Formula σ stabilizes’ can
itself be expressed in a Σ2-fashion over Lζ . Or one may argue this directly from
Corollary 1 to the Uniform Definability Lemma. In more detail we may set
S(x, y)←→‘y ∈ R’ stabilizes ∧ ‘x ∈ R’ = F at any stage after ‘y ∈ R’ stabilizes
and
T (x, y)←→‘y ∈ R’ stabilizes ∧‘x ∈ R’ = F at some stage after ‘y ∈ R’ stabilizes.
The Lemma itself follows from relativising all such concepts to the oracle A. The
ordinal ζ is replaced by ζ(A) the least ordinal ζ¯ so that Lζ¯ [A] has a Σ2-elementary
end-extension. This ordinal ζ(A) is then the least ordinal so that any A-revision-
theoretically definable relation has stabilized in its revision sequence by stage ζ(A).
The A-a.q.i. relations are then Σ2-definable over Lζ(A)[A], and one proceeds to
argue that they form a Spector class as before.
For a recursive or hyperarithmetic starting distribution of truth values we
let the Herzberger sequence commencing with Hh0 = h be: 〈Hhα | α ∈ On〉, with
eventual stability set Hh∞. If h = ∅, where all sentences are initially assigned falsity,
then it is omitted. The following lemma sketches why starting with different hypothe-
ses leads to stability the sets that, “up to isomorphism” are the ‘same’. Sameness here
is not identity, but in computational terms they are equivalent: there is a pencil and
paper algorithm that given a number from one sets computes a corresponding value
in the other, and vice versa.
Lemma 5 Hh∞ is recursively isomorphic to the stability set obtained by taking h =
∅. That is Hh∞ ≡1 H∞.
Proving that Hh∞ ≡1 H∞ holds directly appears difficult. So we go via Σ2-truth
sets of the Go¨del L-hierarchy.
Proof Let 〈Hν | ν ∈ On〉 be the Herzberger revision sequence commencing with
H0 = ∅. Let (ζ¯ , Σ¯) be the lexicographic least pair with Lζ¯ ≺Σ2 LΣ¯ . By absolute-
ness of the definition of 〈Hν〉ν∈On we shall have that (〈Hν〉)LΣ = 〈Hν | ν < Σ〉.
Since Hζ (HΣ) is defined by the Σ2 liminf rule, it is thus Σ2-definable over Lζ (LΣ).
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We use the notation ‘n ∈ Tα’ to denote that n is (a code of) a sentence in the Σ2-truth
set, or theory, of Lα . We shall then have that n ∈ Hζ , if it holds, is one Σ2 fact that
holds about n over Lζ and so contributes to Tζ . There is thus a 1-1 recursive function
so that n ∈ Hζ↔g(n) ∈ Tζ .
By the given Σ2-elementarity Hζ = HΣ and so this pair of ordinals gives the
first pair of repeating extensions of the T -symbol in the revision sequence: it is the
beginning of Herzberger’s “Grand Loop”. ThusHζ = H∞ and we have thenH∞ ≤1
Tζ (where ≤1 stands for “is 1-1 reducible to”).
However we can show that Tζ ≤1 H∞. This is shown in [25] in the proof of
Lemma 2.6. More precisely, it is shown there that there is a (1-1) recursive function
g¯, so that for any limit ordinal λ < Σ that T̂λ = g¯−1“Hλ. Here T̂λ is the Liminf of
the theories Tα for α < λ: σ ∈ T̂λ↔∃α < λ∀β > α
(
β < λ → σ ∈ Tβ
)
.
But for Lλ a model of Kripke-Platek set theory KP, it can be easily shown that
this liminf theory is just the Σ2-theory Tλ. [For the ‘harder’ direction: as Lλ |= KP
it satisfies Π2-Reflection, that is for any Π2 sentence τ , if Lλ |= τ then there are
unboundedly many α < λ with Lα |= τ . Hence τ ∈ could not be in T̂λ.] As Lζ has
a Σ2-end extension, it can be reasoned that it is such a model of KP, and thus Tζ =
g¯−1“Hζ . As Hζ = H∞ we get Tζ ≤1 Hζ = H∞. Together with the last paragraph
this yields Tζ ≡1 H∞, that is recursive isomorphism, between these two sets.
All the above relatives uniformly to any starting hypothesis H0 = h for any h. We
have then (with obvious adaptations of notation) that T hζ ≡1 Hh∞ with appropriate
ordinals ζ h,Σh.
In particular if h is recursive, or indeed hyperarithmetic, we shall have that Lζh[h]
is just Lζ (and similarly for the Σ case). It can be shown that such h are outright Σ1-
definable over Lζ (or LΣ) without the use of any further parameters. But this means
that the Σ2-Theory of Lζh[h], that is T hζ , will be recursively obtainable via a (1-1)
reduction procedure from Tζ alone. Thus we shall have: Hh∞ ≡1 T hζ ≤1 Tζ ≡1 H∞.
But conversely Tζ ≤1 T hζ because the ‘pure’ L-part of the Σ2-theory T hζ is easy to
extract: it is just thoseΣ2-sentences that do not mention the predicate for h anywhere.
Thus H∞≤1Hh∞, and we have the final recursive isomorphism: Hh∞≡1H∞.
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